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I.

Introduction

California will likely see a 16-inch sea level rise by 2050 and a 55-inch
level rise by the end of the century.1 In the Bay Area alone, 213,000 acres
will be vulnerable to flooding by year 2100.2 Those 213,000 acres include
major airports, ports, roads and residential neighborhoods.3 The Public
Trust Doctrine holds that navigable waters and tidal lands are the property
of the state, and must be protected and kept accessible for the general
public. On the California coast, the line between private lots and public
land is drawn along the mean high tide line—and as the Pacific Ocean rises,
that line will encroach on land that is currently held privately.
What happens when this movement occurs? Do littoral landholders
lose property or does the public? And when the State attempts to
implement regional sea level rise mitigation plans, can it forbid individuals
from building seawalls to protect their homes when those seawalls
contradict regional plans? Or require them to abandon their lots as part of a
strategy of managed retreat and wetlands restoration? If the State so
significantly restricts what a landowner can do, or not do, to protect their
property, do such regulations constitute takings under the Fifth
Amendment?
Because the California State Legislature has yet to adopt new
regulations to guide sea level rise adaption, the California Coastal
Commission is left modifying or adapting existing regulatory mechanisms in
its effort to address and mitigate the effects sea level rise.4 The Commission
currently uses its standing authority to require setbacks on new
developments and to apply assumption of risk clauses to new development

1. S.F. PLANNING AND URBAN RESEARCH ASS’N [hereinafter SPUR], SPUR Report:
Climate Change Hits Home 9 (2011), available at http://www.spur.org/publications/
library/report/climate-change-hits-home.
2. S.F. BAY CONSERVATION AND DEV. COMM’N [hereinafter BCDC], LIVING WITH A
RISING BAY: VULNERABILITY AND ADAPTATION IN S.F. BAY AND ON ITS SHORELINE, 26 (2011),
available at http://www.bcdc.ca.gov/BPA/LivingWithRisingBay.pdf.
3.

Id. at 2-4.

4. CAL. COASTAL COMM’N, OVERVIEW OF SEA LEVEL RISE AND SOME IMPLICATIONS FOR
COASTAL CALIFORNIA: 25 (2001), available at http://www.coastal.ca.gov/climate/
SeaLevelRise2001.pdf.
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permits that prohibit the future construction of seawalls.5 The problem is
that the Commission’s ability to restrict seawall construction on the part of
existing permit-holders whose permits do not include assumption of risk
clauses is less clear. This is where the Public Trust Doctrine comes into
play.
In this note I explore the interplay between the Public Trust Doctrine
and the encroachment of the Pacific Ocean onto privately held coastal
property in California. I will attempt to synthesize the Public Trust Doctrine,
Fifth Amendment takings, implications of sea level rise in California, and
explain how the Public Trust can be used to justify the drastic measures the
State will be forced to take to deal with those implications. Lastly, I will
show that because the Public Trust Doctrine holds that the State must
protect the coastline for and make it available and accessible to the general
public, the State can utilize the doctrine to prevent private property owners
from arming the coast to protect their land from sea level rise without those
regulations succumbing to takings claims.

II.

The Public Trust Doctrine
A. The Basics of the Public Trust Doctrine

“By the law of nature these things are common to all mankind, the air,
running water, the sea and consequently the shores of the sea.”6 In
America’s early years as a nation, the states adopted this ancient Roman
doctrine as part of their own common law.7 Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. State
of Illinois,8 is the fundamental U.S. Public Trust case. There the Supreme
Court upheld the revocation of a grant of most of Chicago’s lakefront to the
Illinois Central Railroad Co.9 on the grounds that Public Trust lands cannot
be transferred entirely outside the control of the state.10 The Court
explained that:
It is the settled law of this country that the ownership of and
dominion and sovereignty over lands covered by tide waters,
within the limits of the several states, belong to the respective
states within which they are found, with the consequent right to
use or dispose of any portion thereof, when that can be done

5.

Id.

6. David Takacs, The Public Trust Doctrine, Environmental Human Rights, and the
Future of Private Property, 16 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 711, 713 (2008), quoting Justinian.
7.

Id. at 713.

8.

146 U.S. 387 (1892).

9.

Illinois Central at 462.

10.

Id. at 454.
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without substantial impairment of the interest of the public in
the waters, and subject always to the paramount right of
congress to control their navigation so far as may be necessary
for the regulation of commerce with foreign nations and among
the states.11
With Illinois Central, the Supreme Court established that tidal lands are the
property of the
State in which they lie, and that those lands can only be transferred
out of state hands when such a transfer is not adverse to the public interest
in those lands and waters.
In California, the legislature codified the Public Trust principles upheld
in Illinois Central with the passage of Article X, section 4 of the California
Constitution. The Article holds:
No individual, partnership, or corporation, claiming or
possessing the frontage or tidal lands of a harbor, bay, inlet,
estuary, or other navigable water in this State, shall be permitted
to exclude the right of way to such water whenever it is required
for any public purpose, nor to destroy or obstruct the free
navigation of such water; and the Legislature shall enact such
laws as will give the most liberal construction to this provision,
so that access to the navigable waters of this State shall always
be attainable for the people thereof.12
Article X, section 4 statutorily protects the coast for the public. It precludes
landholders from developing so as to exclude the general public from the
use of navigable waters and tidal lands.
In 1970, then University of Michigan law professor Joseph Sax revived
the use of the Public Trust Doctrine in environmental litigation with his
article The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial
Intervention.13 Sax wrote that “certain interests are so particularly the gifts of
nature’s bounty that they ought to be reserved for the whole of the
populace.”14 He further wrote that public accessibility to those interests is
what distinguishes society “as one of citizens rather than of serfs,” and that
no privileged minority of the population can be permitted to maintain
exclusive control of those interests.15 In considering Sax’s take on the Public

252

11.

Id. at 435.

12.

CAL. CONST. art. X, § 4.

13.

68 MICH. L. REV. 471 (1970).

14.

Id. at 484.

15.

Takacs, supra note 6, at 716 (discussing Sax, supra note 13).
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Trust Doctrine, Professor David Takacs explained that “Sax is concerned
with . . . ‘a diffuse majority [being] made subject to the will of a concerted
minority.’ That ‘concerted minority’ is private property owners whose private
economic interests lead them to arrogate ecological resources, which, by
right, belong to the public.”16
As Illinois Central, Sax, and Takacs emphasize, private rights held in
coastal Public Trust land are not as sacredly protected as traditional real
property rights. Instead they are usufructuary, existing only relative to the
rights of others. Takacs contends that Public Trust property rights are like
water rights in that they are regulated and subject to limitation or
revocation.17 In the case of California’s coast therefore, owners of beachfront
lots do not have unrestricted leeway to build seawalls or otherwise arm the
coast to protect their individual parcels. The Public Trust provides for the
protection and preservation of coastal lands in their natural state for public
use; and even where Trust lands are privately owned, such ownership rights
are subordinate to Trust interests. An owner of beachfront land therefore,
may not build a seawall or other armoring structure that will negatively alter
beaches and undermine the public’s right to enjoy and access those beaches
under the Public Trust Doctrine.

B. The California Coastal Act as the State’s Recognition
and Codification of the Public Trust
The California Legislature passed the Coastal Act in 1976,18 codifying
five basic policy objectives that include preserving coastal ecosystems and
ensuring public access to the shoreline.19 Although voters established the
California Coastal Commission by initiative in 1972, the Coastal Act (“Act”)
made the Commission permanent20 and charged it with “protecting and
enhancing coastal resources, ensuring balanced resource use, maximizing
public access, ensuring priority of coastal-dependent uses, and encouraging
coordinated planning.”21 The Coastal Commission maintains jurisdiction
over the coastal zone, an area designated by the legislature that extends
from three miles into the ocean to between a few hundred feet to five miles

16.

Id. at 716 (quoting Sax, supra note 13).

17.

Id. at 721.

18. Program Overview, California Coastal
gov/whoweare.html (Last visited Nov. 17, 2011).

Cmm’n,

http://www.coastal.ca.

19. Meg Caldwell & Craig H. Segall, No Day at the Beach: Sea Level Rise, Ecosystem
Loss, and Public Access Along the California Coast, 34 ECOLOGY L.Q. 533, 544 (2007).
20.

Cal. Coastal Comm’n, supra note 18.

21.

Caldwell & Segall, supra note 19, at 544.
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inland.22 All development within this zone must comply with a permit from
either the Coastal Commission (or the Bay Conservation and Development
Commission (“BCDC”) in the San Francisco Bay) or a local government
acting under a Commission-certified Local Coastal Program.23
The
Commission’s issuance and denial of development permits, as prescribed by
the Act, must be in accordance with the Commission’s stated policy goals—
to protect the coastal environment, to assure “balanced utilization and
conservation of coastal zone resources [and to] . . . maximize public access
to and along the coast.”24
Not only does the Coastal Act broadly call for protection of the coastal
zone and public accessibility to it, provisions throughout the Act explicitly
enforce Public Trust principles.
Section 30001.5 is one of these
provisionsthe basic goals of state management of the coastal zone are to
“[m]aximize public access to and along the coast and maximize public
recreational opportunities in the coastal zone . . . .”25 This provision is a
straightforward recognition of the State’s intent to uphold the Public Trust
by ensuring that the shoreline is available for public use and enjoyment.
Section 30609.5 is also particularly illustrative of the Act’s recognition
of the Public Trust Doctrine:
[N]o state land that is located between the first public road and
the sea . . . shall be transferred or sold by the state to any private
entity unless the state retains a permanent property interest in the land
adequate to provide public access to or along the sea. In any transfer or
sale of real property by a state agency to a private entity or
person pursuant to this section, the instrument of conveyance
created by the state shall require that the private entity or person
or the entity or person’s successors or assigns manage the
property in such a way as to ensure that existing or potential
public access is not diminished. The instrument of conveyance
shall further require that any violation of this management requirement
shall result in the reversion of the real property to the state.26
This section codifies the Public Trust principle that the State holds the
coastline in trust for the public.27 It asserts that in instances where land is
transferred into private hands the State retains an interest in the property so
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22.

Cal. Coastal Comm’n, supra note 18.

23.

Id.

24.

CAL. COASTAL ACT, § 30001.5 (West 2012).

25.

CAL. COASTAL ACT, § 30001.5(c).

26.

Id. at § 30609.5(a) (emphasis added).

27.

Id. at § 30609.5
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as to assure public access to the shoreline.28 In its final clause, section
30609.5(a) states that if a property owner who has agreed to provide for
public beach access fails to do so, the property in question will revert to the
State.29 By providing for reversion of private property into the State’s hands
when a property owner violates Trust principles, the legislature
demonstrated that it holds Public Trust principles in the highest regard, and
that not even private littoral landowners have the leeway to infringe on
those principles.
The overall goals of the Coastal Act and sections30 including 30001.5
and 30609.5, make clear that the State considers protection and preservation
of, and public accessibility to the coast priorities of coastal management.
Furthermore, in codifying these Trust values, the Coastal Act provides
grounds for enforcing those principles apart from and independent of the
Public Trust Doctrine common law. Additionally, the limited California case
law on this topic reinforces the Coastal Commission’s power under the
Coastal Act to limit private property rights in accordance with Trust
priorities of access and preservation.
1. Coastal Act Conflict Between Protecting Existing
Structures and Protecting the Natural Coastline
While Coastal Act sections 30001.5 and 30609.5 demand that the
Commission prioritize coastal access and shoreline protection, property
owners contend that section 30235 guarantees shoreline armoring when a
home faces imminent danger.31 Section 30235 states:
Revetments, breakwaters, groins, harbor channels, seawalls, cliff
retaining walls, and other such construction that alters natural
shoreline processes shall be permitted when required to serve
coastal-dependent uses or to protect existing structures or public
beaches in danger from erosion and when designed to eliminate
or mitigate adverse impacts on local shoreline sand supply
(emphasis added) . . . .32

28.

Id. at § 30609.5(c)

29.

Id.

30. Sections 30210, 30211 and 30212 all also explicitly seek to ensure that
public access to the shore remains the highest priority of California coastal
development.
31. Todd T. Cardiff, Conflict in the California Coastal Act: Sand and Seawalls, 38 CAL.
W. L. REV. 255, 257 (Fall 2001).
32.

CAL. COASTAL ACT § 30235.
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This section pitches the Act’s overarching goals of coastal preservation and
access against section 30235’s specific mandate to protect existing
structures. However, the meaning of “existing structures” is a source of
debatesome contend that the phrase refers to any standing structure,
regardless of when it was built, while others argue that “existing” applies
only to development completed prior to when the Coastal Act became
effective.33
The legislative history of the Act, and its undeniable conservationist
overtones, support the position that the legislature intended section 30235
to only protect structures in existence prior to the enactment of the Coastal
Act in 1976.34 Analysis of section 30235’s legislative history reveals the fact
that the word “existing” was not present in earlier versions of the Act but was
included in the final version in order to distinguish between structures
existing prior to the Act’s passage and those that would be constructed in
the future.35
Additionally, section 30253(b)which prohibits new
development from “contribut[ing] significantly to erosion, geologic
instability, or destruction of the site or surrounding area or in any way
require the construction of protective devices . . .” 36would be superfluous
if “existing” in section 30235 did not distinguish between pre-Coastal Act
and post-Coastal Act development.
If section 30235 requires seawall protection of structures no matter
when the structures were built, then the requirements of 30253(b) are
effectively meaningless.37 Section 30253(b) prohibits new structures from
being built in places where they will require the construction of protective
devices such as seawalls. Section 30235 requires the Commission to permit
protective devices to protect “existing structures.” If “existing structures” in
30235 referred to both pre and post Coastal Act development, then section
30253(b)’s requirement that new development be set far back enough to not
require shoreline protection in the future would be without purpose.
Therefore, the most logical interpretation of these two sections is that 30235
requires the Commission to permit seawalls when necessary to protect preCoastal Act development, and 30253(b) requires that all development
constructed since the Act’s passage be set far back enough from the coast so
as not to require shoreline armoring in the future.
This conclusion drawn from the legislative history and textual analysis
of sections 30235 and 30253; coupled with the overall environmentalist tone

33. Surfrider Found. v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 2006 WL 1530224 at 2 (Cal. Ct.
App. June 5, 2006).

256

34.

Cardiff, supra note 31, at 262-63.

35.

Id. at 267.

36.

CAL. COASTAL ACT § 30253(b).

37.

Cardiff, supra note 31, at 269.
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of the Coastal Act and sections 30001.5 and 30609.5, which prioritize coastal
preservation; are further evidence of the legislative intent that the Act be
used primarily to preserve the natural shoreline and ensure public
accessibility to it. And, as I discuss throughout the remainder of this paper,
the Public Trust Doctrine, which both reinforces and is reinforced by the
Coastal Act, requires above all else, the State protect the coastline for public
use.

III.

Fifth Amendment Takings

The final clause of the Fifth Amendment holds: “nor shall private
property be taken for public use, without just compensation.”38 The takings
provision does not prevent the government from claiming private property
for public use. Instead it requires the government to compensate an owner
for property when State action or regulation is found to be a taking that
wholly deprives property of its value. The takings doctrine pertains to the
discussion of sea level rise and coastal armoring in that if a private property
owner is prohibited from arming their land from rising oceans, those owners
are likely to claim that the prohibition against seawall construction is a
regulatory taking.
A regulatory taking differs from a physical taking in that it occurs
when the government regulates so as to render a landowner’s property
valueless. In Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council,39 the Supreme Court
considered the constitutionality of the Beachfront Management Act; which
effectively barred Lucas from building homes on his two beachfront
parcels.40
Lucas argued that the ban imposed by the Beachfront
Management Act was a regulatory takingthe Court agreed.41 The opinion
in Lucas explains that there are two kinds of takingsthose in which there is
a physical invasion of private property and those in which a regulation
“denies all economically beneficial or productive use of land.”42 The Court
writes that the second category, regulatory takings, is justified on the
grounds that a regulation denying all economically beneficial use of land “is,
from the landowner’s point of view, the equivalent of a physical
appropriation.”43 However, where the “State ‘reasonably concludes that ‘the
health, safety, morals, or general welfare’ [of the public] would be promoted
by prohibiting particular contemplated uses of land,’ compensation need

38.

U.S. CONST. amend. V.

39.

505 U.S. 1003 (1992).

40.

Lucas at 1007.

41.

Id. at 1009.

42.

Id. at 1015.

43.

Id. at 1017.
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not accompany prohibition.”44 In this particular case, the Court found that
the Beachfront Management Act did deny Lucas all economically beneficial
use of his land, and was therefore an unconstitutional taking.45
The paramount takings case is Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of
New York.46
The Court there explained that the “Fifth Amendment’s guarantee . . .
[is] designed to bar Government from forcing some people alone to bear
public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the
public as a whole.”47 This proclamation holds that when the government
“takes” private property to accomplish a greater public good (such as
construct a highway, remake a blighted neighborhood, etc.), the owner of
the taken property cannot be forced to alone bear the cost of losing property
that will go to benefit the general public. However, the takings clause does
not imply that the general public must bear the burdens of a select few.
While the takings doctrine prohibits an individual property owner from
bearing the costs of the general public, the doctrine does not support the
inverse theory. That is, it does not hold that the public must pay the costs of
protecting the interests of a select few.
With Penn Central the Supreme Court found that there is no clear test
for determining when government action effectuates a taking. Instead, the
Court held that takings analyses are based on a three-factor ad hoc
evaluation of the particular set of circumstances.48 This ad hoc evaluation
consists of the following elements: (1) the economic impact of the
regulation; (2) the extent to which the regulation has interfered with distinct,
investment-backed expectations; and (3) the character of the action (e.g.,
whether the action is a physical invasion, or whether it affects a single
property owner or property owners generally).49
Nollan v. California Coastal Commission50 is another seminal takings case.
There the Supreme Court found that the Coastal Commission’s grant of a
building permit conditioned upon a public easement to cross the plaintiff’s
beachfront property was an unconstitutional taking.51 The Court added to
the standard takings analysis here in holding that there must be a
substantial nexus between a permit condition imposed and the justification

44. Id. at 1014 (citing Penn Cent. Transportation Co. v. City of New York, 438
U.S. 104 (1978)).
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45.

Id. at 1031-32.

46.

438 U.S. 104 (1978).

47.

Id. at 123 (quoting Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960)).

48.

Penn Central at 124.

49.

Id. at 124, 134.

50.

483 U.S. 825 (1987).

51.

Id. at 841-42.
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for such a condition.52 The Court found in this situation that the required
nexus did not exist. It held that the Coastal Commission required the
easement across Nollan’s property because the proposed development
would block the public’s view of the beach, but that an easement across the
property did not actually solve the problem of houses blocking visual access
to the beach from the road.53
Seven years after Nollan, the Supreme Court again added an element to
the takings analysis. In Dolan v. City of Tigard,54 the Court held that there must
be “rough proportionality” between the condition placed on a permit and
the reason for the imposition of the condition.55 The Court explained that
“[n]o precise mathematical calculation is required, but [one] must make
some sort of individualized determination that the required dedication is
related both in nature and extent to the impact of the proposed
development.”56 In this instance the Court found that, while requiring a
greenway for flood control was a valid condition on the plaintiff’s building
permit, requiring such a greenway to be made available for public use was
not roughly proportional to flood control.57
According to Penn Central, finding an unconstitutional taking requires
that a government action has a severe economic impact, interferes with the
property owner’s distinct investment backed expectations, and has a
discriminatory character. Lucas further requires that, for an action to be a
regulatory taking, the regulation in question must deny an owner all
economic use of their land and not be in furtherance of the general welfare.
Additionally, if the takings analysis involves conditions placed on building
permits, Nollan and Dolan require such a condition to be substantially related
and roughly proportional to the goal sought to be achieved by the condition.
In addition to informing the analysis due a takings claim, these cases
illuminate the ever-present struggle between protection of private property
rights, environmental land management, and the greater public good. The
American legal system is based on a deep-seeded regard for private
property; yet in this day and age, where open land is increasingly less
plentiful, the greater public good is often sacrificed to the exercise of a
single landholder’s own property interests. Lucas, Penn Central, Nollan, and
Dolan all face these conflicting interests, and while the Court’s opinions in
these cases reveal a willingness to cut into private property rights under very
particular circumstances, it exhibits a strong proclivity towards protecting

52.

Id. at 837.

53.

Id. at 838-39.

54.

512 U.S. 374 (1994).

55.

Id. at 391.

56.

Id.

57.

Id. at 393-94.
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against such intrusions. That hesitancy means that private property owners
will often have the upper hand when it comes to litigating seawall
prohibitions.

IV.

California Sea Level Rise and the Public Trust
A. The Basics of Rising Ocean Levels in California

Ocean levels are rising globally because of thermal expansion and
melting glaciers and ice sheets.58 As the temperature on earth increases, the
ocean retains more land-generated and atmospheric heat and thereby
expands up onto shore.59 The oceans’ absorption of melted ice coming off of
land-based glaciers and ice sheets, particularly those that have historically
occupied extensive areas of Greenland and Antarctica, are also contributing
to rising sea levels.60 This combination of heat absorption and melting landbased ice is predicted to cause a 16-inch increase in ocean levels by 2050
and a 55-inch increase by 2100.61
The 2007 climate change report published by the Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change (“IPCC”) explains that while oceans have
experienced yearly rises since the end of the ice age, the rate has increased
in the last two decades.62 Twentieth century estimates show that sea levels
typically rose at a rate of around 1.7 mm yr–1; but satellite data and coastal
gauge information collected between 1993 and 2003 demonstrate that sea
level rise has accelerated to an average of 3 mm yr–1.63 Furthermore, the IPCC
estimates under certain emissions scenarios, the rate of sea level rise could
increase to 4 mm yr–1.64
According to a 2011 report published by BCDC, 180,000 acres of San
Francisco Bay shoreline will be vulnerable to flooding by 2050, and another
33,000 acres will be vulnerable by the end of the century.65 As the BCDC
report explains, the 180,000 Bay Area acres correspond to the 100-year
floodplain,66 and are most likely to see sea-level-rise-related flooding with

58.

SPUR, supra note 1, at 9.

59.

Id.

60.

Id.

61.

Id.

62. IPCC FOURTH ASSESSMENT REPORT: CLIMATE CHANGE 2007, WORKING GROUP I:
THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS, http://www.ipcc.ch/publications_and_data/ar4/wg1/en/faq5-1.html (last visited Feb. 3, 2012).
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63.

Id.

64.

Id.

65.

BCDC, supra note 2, at 45.

66.

Id. at 26.
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extreme storm eventswhich could become more likely as global
temperature increases and whether patterns change.67 Along with airports,
businesses, ports, roads, and railroads, the 100-year floodplain in the Bay
Area alone includes 66,000 acres of residential development.68 A football
field is about one acre; so an area of Bay Area land equivalent to about
213,000 football fields could be under water in a major storm event by year
2100the entire California coast will face a similar situation.

B. Seawalls and Coastal Armoring as Options to Protect
Coastline Development
Along California’s over 2,000 miles of tidal coastline (including bays
and inlets) around 1,100 miles of new or modified seawalls or other
protection structures would be needed to protect development from
flooding.69 A May 2009 report from the California Climate Change Center
estimates that building or upgrading 1,100 miles of seawalls would cost $14
billion in year 2000 dollars, and that those structures would then require
$1.4 billion (in year 2000 dollars) a year in maintenance.70
Not only are structures designed to arm the coast incredibly costprohibitive on as large a scale as considered here, they are also incredibly
environmentally detrimental. Coastal armoring structures include seawalls,
revetments, and bulkheads.71 “Seawalls are designed to resist the forces of
storm waves; bulkheads are to retain the fill; and revetments are to protect
the shoreline against the erosion associated with light waves.”72 Each of
these structures designed to protect coastal development fix the position of
the coastline.73 This fixation results in a loss of beach due both to the
footprint of the structure itself and to passive erosiona process in which
the beach drowns because the armoring structure prevents the rising ocean
from moving inland and creating new beach.74
Imagine that a city, in an effort to protect a coastal road, builds a wall
on the beach along the coastal roadway. With the construction of the wall
the public has already lost a few feet of usable beach to the footprint of the

67.

Id. at 45.

68.

Id. at 48.

69. MATTHEW HEBERGER, HEATHER COOLEY, PABLO HERRERA, PETER H. GLEICK & ELI
MOORE, CAL. CLIMATE CHANGE CENTER, THE IMPACTS OF SEA LEVEL RISE ON THE CALIFORNIA
COAST 3 (2009).
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structure. Now picture an extreme winter storm season with waves coming
further inland than in the past due to higher than normal sea levels. On an
unaltered beach, this intense wave activity would push sand further inland,
essentially pushing the entire beach further inland. However, where there is
a seawall, this inland movement of the beach is stopped short. Instead of
waves pushing the beach inland, the movement is frozen at the seawall. As
the ocean continues to rise up against the wall, it drowns the sandy beach,
prohibited from inland migration by the wall.
Less expensive and environmentally detrimental options are to either
bolster beaches with foliage or other nourishment or to implement plans of
managed coastline retreat and let nature take its course.75
Beach
nourishment is a process in which sand is brought in and added to a
drowning beach to restore dry sand beach and act as a buffer between
seaside development and the ocean. Managed retreat involves abandoning
vulnerable coastal development and infrastructure or moving those
structures further inland. The logic behind managed retreat is that because
coastal armoring damages the natural coastal environment, and because
such structures are not economically feasible on a massive scale, some
coastal development will need to be sacrificed in order to allow for the
natural advancement of the shoreline.76

C. The Intersection of Coastal Armoring and the Public
Trust Doctrine
1. Government Violation of the Public Trust Doctrine
If the State decided to address sea level rise by armoring the 1,100
miles of coast that would need armoring, the Coastal Commission and the
local and federal agencies with jurisdiction throughout the state’s coastal
zone would oversee such a plan. However, in our already debt-ridden state,
executing a fourteen billion dollar coastal armoring plan is impractical and
unrealistic. Furthermore, the Public Trust Doctrine and the Coastal Act’s
reinforcement of it prohibit the State from doing or allowing anything that
would destroy or eliminate public access to the shoreand large scale
coastal armoring would do just that.
Clearly a government sea level rise adaptation strategy involving the
widespread construction of seawalls is problematic. However, it must be
conceded that the State’s failure to build coastal protective structures would

75. Associated Press, Economists Say Sea Level Rise would Be Costly, CBSNEWS (Sep.
14, 2011), http://www.cbsnews.com/2100-501369_162-20106389.html.
76. U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, NAT’L OCEANIC AND ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., OCEAN AND
COASTAL RES. MGMT., http://coastalmanagement.noaa.gov/initiatives/shoreline_ ppr_
retreat.html (last visited Nov. 18, 2011).
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result in adverse consequences as well. Where protective structures are not
built, coastal property will be vulnerable to flooding, and as the ocean rises
that vulnerable property is going to face damage or destruction. Even lands
the Public Trust currently serves to protect could be lost to unimpeded
rising seas (though note that as the mean high tide line migrates inland, so
too do lands protected by the Public Trust). Property damage is not
something to take lightly; but as discussed, a 1,100-mile seawall is simply
not a feasible or acceptable solution.
2. Private Violation of the Public Trust Doctrine
While the Public Trust and the Coastal Act prohibit the Coastal
Commission and local governments from constructing seawalls up and
down the coast to the detriment of the state’s beaches and public access to
those beaches, whether or not those prohibitions apply to private actors is
somewhat less clear. On the face of the issue, one would assume that a
private property owner has a right to protect his home from flood damage,
and that such a right to protect one’s property includes building a seawall to
protect the property from flooding. However, there are several issues with a
littoral landowner building a seawall to arm his land against sea level rise,
even if that wall is entirely within the limits of that landowner’s lot: such
walls may divert wave energy so as to more seriously accelerate the erosion
of neighboring lots,77, 78 may conflict with a state-wide sea level rise
adaptation plan, and will most certainly damage Public Trust interests in the
beaches on which such walls are constructed.
Herein lies the tension to be explored in the remainder of this paper:
how do we square private property rights, and a landowner’s right to protect
their property from flooding, with the Public Trust and the State’s obligation
to protect the shoreline environment and maintain public access to it.

77. Monterey Bay Nat’l Marine Sanctuary, MBNMS RESOURCE MANAGEMENT
ISSUES: COASTAL ARMORING, http://montereybay.noaa.gov/resourcepro/resmanissues/
coastal.html (last visited Jan. 12, 2012).
78. In addition to constituting Public Trust violations against the general
public, a littoral landowner’s construction of a seawall is also a Public Trust
violation, a nuisance, and an infringement of property rights against the seawall
builder’s neighbors. This however, is another issue to be explored in another paper.
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How the Public Trust Doctrine Can be Used to Restrict
Coastal Armoring on Private Property
A. Overview of Using the Public Trust to Restrict Armoring
Measures Utilized by Littoral Property Holders

As discussed above, large-scale coastal armoring along the California
shoreline is cost prohibitive, environmentally detrimental, and a violation of
Public Trust principles. On the other hand, private property rights are
among the most fundamental rights recognized and adamantly protected in
the United States. One can only expect that as sea level rise becomes more
imminent and threatening, property owners are going to do whatever they
can to protect their coastal homes. And one of the actions those property
owners are likely to take is to build seawalls and otherwise arm their coastal
lots. Even if such structures are built entirely within the limits of one’s
private property, their effects, especially when multiplied by a large number
of landholders, are Public Trust violations.
In California, the Coastal Act mandates that development activities,
which include “construction of buildings, divisions of land, and activities
that change the intensity of use of land or public access to coastal waters,”
must comply with a coastal development permit.79 According to the Coastal
Act, those seeking to develop must obtain a permit from either the local
government or the California Coastal Commission,80 or BCDC in the Bay
Area. As discussed earlier in the paper, the Coastal Commission is
obligated to issue or deny permits in accordance with the Public Trust
principles codified in the Coastal Actincluding preservation of the natural
shoreline for public use and enjoyment.
As sea level rise related flood events become more likely, one can
expect the Coastal Commission to begin working with local governments to
develop both regional and statewide adaptation and protection plans. At
the same time, private property owners are going to begin armoring the
coast along their lots in an effort to protect their homes. When the Coastal
Commission either denies such coastal armoring permits, or brings
enforcement actions against those who build without permits in violation of
the Coastal Act, landowners are likely to bring takings claims against the
State.
Perhaps unfortunately for those property owners, Public Trust
principles, as codified by the Coastal Act, the California Constitution, and
ascribed to by case law, vest in the State the authority to deny permits for
destructive armoring structures in the name of environmental protection
and coastal accessibility.
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1. Case Law Reinforcing that the Coastal Act Provides for
State Enforcement of Public Trust Principles
Since the Coastal Act was passed in 1976, California courts have
continually recognized that the Act broadly serves to ensure public access to
the state’s beaches and that the State can restrict littoral property rights
under the Coastal Act in furtherance of that prescribed public access. In Sea
Ranch Association v. California Coastal Commission81 a California court held that
“[m]aximum access is to be provided and developments [are] not to
interfere with the public’s right to access to the sea.”82 The opinion then
stated that “public access and aesthetic considerations constitute areas that
legitimately fall within the Commission’s regulatory power.”83 In other
words, the court in Sea Ranch recognized that advancing Public Trust
interests, including those interests in public access to and aesthetic
enjoyment of the coast, are within the Coastal Commission’s statutorily
bestowed authority.
In addition to the Coastal Act’s broad directive to ensure public beach
access, several provisions in the Act specifically serve to uphold and make
enforceable Public Trust principles; and those provisions create statutory
grounds upon which the State can restrict a private property owner’s
claimed right to arm their coastal property despite the environmental effects
such armoring has. Case law addressing the topic of coastal armoring
further reinforces the State’s authority. In Whaler’s Village v. California Coastal
Commission,84 the California Court of Appeals addressed a dispute over
whether the Commission had the authority to place certain conditions on an
after-the-fact development permit allowing the homeowners of Whaler’s
Village in Ventura to keep a rock revetment constructed to protect their
homes from wave activity during a heavy storm season.85 The permit
conditions included an unconditional waiver of any liability on the part of
the Commission for any future erosion damage and a dedication of a public
easement along the beach fronting the Whaler’s Village properties.86
The court agreed with the Coastal Commission’s argument that “a
fundamental right to protect one’s property under the Constitution is not
the equivalent of a vested right to protect property in a particular manner . . .
.”87 The court further stated:

81.

527 F. Supp. 390 (1981) (vacated because of mootness).

82.

Id. at 392.

83.

Id. at 393.

84.

173 Cal. App. 3d 240 (1985).

85.

Id. at 249.

86.

Id. at 248.

87.

Id. at 252-53.
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[P]roperty ownership rights, reserved to the individual by
constitutional provision, must be subordinated to the rights of
society. It is now a fundamental axiom in the law that one may
not do with his property as he pleases; his use is subject to
reasonable restraints to avoid societal detriment . . . .88
This proclamation, and the Whaler’s opinion generally, serves as an example
of the court’s willingness to uphold the Coastal Commission’s power to
restrict littoral property rights, based on its power under the Coastal Act to
do so, in order to preserve public access to the state’s beaches in
accordance with the Public Trust.
Furthermore, Whaler’s Village demonstrates the court’s broad
acceptance of the principle that property rights do not entitle a landowner to
unbounded development rightsas the court there held, such rights are
subject to “reasonable restraints.”89 Of course the meaning of the word
“reasonable” in legal contexts is a never-ending source of debate. The
beach-going public may think that it is quite reasonable to prohibit seawall
construction where construction will eventually cause the elimination of a
favorite beach. On the other hand, the homeowners seeking approval of a
seawall necessary to save their home from flooding or erosion will quite
certainly find prohibition of the seawall on the basis of beach preservation
entirely unreasonable. However, one cannot deny that protecting a beach
provides the most benefit to the most peoplethe entire public can enjoy a
beautiful beach, but only a single homeowner (and perhaps his friends and
family) benefits from a single beachfront house.

B. California Water Law and How the Usufructuary Nature
of Water Rights Applies to Rights in Public Trust Lands
1. National Audubon Society v. Superior Court of Alpine County
National Audubon Society v. Superior Court of Alpine County,90 a case
regarding the City of Los Angeles’s appropriation of water from the
tributaries of Mono Lake, represents a drastic shift in the court’s
understanding and use of the Public Trust Doctrine. Mono Lake, like the
California Coast, is an ecological and scenic asset.91 The lake is filled with
freshwater from mountain streams, and because there are no outlets it
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maintains a delicate salt, saline, and alkaline balance.92 The Los Angeles
Department of Water and Power (“DWP”) received permission in 1940 from
the California State Water Resources Control Board to divert water from the
streams and creeks that feed Mono Lake.93 At the time the plaintiffs brought
suit, DWP’s diversions had caused a severe drop in the lake’s surface area
and volume, the transformation of an island seagull rookery into an easily
accessible and unprotected peninsula, and general destruction of the
ecosystem.94
Recognizing that the Public Trust, aside from ensuring navigability and
public access, serves to protect the ecological and aesthetic benefits of Trust
lands, the court found that the Public Trust was a sound basis on which to
restrict DWP’s appropriations of water from the Mono Lake tributaries.95 The
California Supreme Court here held that regardless of DWP’s existing
appropriative water rights, the State was obligated under the Public Trust to
protect the lake as far as feasible.96 Furthermore, the court wrote that the
State has authority to reevaluate existing allocations of water even where
those allocations were originally granted in consideration of and despite
their effect on the Public Trust.97
While California water rights have never enjoyed the same level of
absoluteness typically attributed to rights in land, the court’s logic in all but
revoking DWP’s water rights based on the damage the exercise of those
rights imposed on Trust resources applies to littoral property rights as well.
In Audubon the court understood that allowing DWP to continue diverting as
much water as it was would result in total, irreparable destruction of the
Mono Lake ecosystem; and because the lake is protected by the Public Trust,
that destruction was in violation of the principles of the doctrine. In
accordance with the Public Trust, the court was forced to take drastic
actiontemporarily revoking DWP’s water rights—in order to halt and
reverse the lake’s decline.
The Mono Lake case was one in which an ecological emergency called
for a drastic legal response. If the court had not limited DWP’s diversions,
Mono Lake, and the unique ecosystem it supported, would have been lost
forever. The situation occurring on the California coast is no different. If not
considered one already, it will soon be an emergencynot only in terms of
potential damage to property and infrastructure, but to the state’s
vulnerable coastline. If we allow panicked construction of seawalls all along
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the coast, we will drown our beaches and destroy the complex ecosystem
that makes the California coast such a treasure.
Audubon shows “that water ‘rights’ are not property, but a kind of
revocable, usufruct privilege that [are] and always [have] been subject to
government redefinition to reflect the changing needs of the citizenryto
reflect changing notions of progress.”98 Rights in coastal Public Trust lands
are also revocable, usufruct privileges. Such rights exist only so far as they
do not interfere with the public’s right to enjoy those lands in their natural
state. And just as the government’s sense of changing public needs has
resulted in redefining the water rights system, changing needs and
environmental circumstances are grounds for redefining the traditional
notion of property rights along the California coast.
2. Joslin v. Marin Municipal Water District
In Joslin v. Marin Municipal Water District,99 the Joslins sued the Marin
Water District for building a dam upstream of their property that diminished
the flow of the stream that ran through the Joslins’ riparian lot.100 The Joslins
were in the business of selling rock and gravel deposited on their land by the
stream, and the construction of the dam restricted the stream’s flow so as to
damage the Joslins’ business and decrease the value of their land.101 The
issue before the court in this case was whether or not Marin Municipal was
liable to the Joslins for appropriating water upstream of the Joslins’ riparian
property and thereby limiting the Joslins’ exercise of their riparian rights.102
The court’s analysis of the Joslins’ claim in this case revolves around
the California water law principles of reasonable and beneficial
usedoctrines beyond the scope of this paper. However, quite relevant
here is the court’s holding that “[w]hile plaintiffs correctly argue that a
property right cannot be taken or damaged without just compensation, they
ignore the necessity of first establishing the legal existence of a
compensable property interest.”103 The court explained that a property right
in water is dependent on the use of water conforming to principles of
reasonable and beneficial use, and that where, as in this case, a use is
unreasonable, there is no protectable right.104 The court established “that
since there was and is no property right in an unreasonable use, there has
been no taking or damaging of property by the deprivation of such use and,

268

98.

Takacs, supra note 6, at 762.

99.

67 Cal. 2d 132 (1967).

100.

Id. at 134.

101.

Id. at 134-35.

102.

Id. at 136.

103.

Id. at 143.

104.

Id. at 144.

West

Northwest, Vol. 19, No. 2, Summer 2013

accordingly, the deprivation is not compensable.”105 Because in this case the
Joslins’ use of water was unreasonable, they did not hold a protectable
interest in that use of the water running through their lot, and therefore
Marin’s appropriation of that water was not an unconstitutional taking
against the Joslins.106
The court’s logic in finding for Marin Municipal is applicable to the
issue of whether littoral property owners in California have a right to build
seawalls in violation of the Public Trust Doctrine. Just as a riparian property
owner’s use of water becomes unreasonable in light of more important
competing uses, a seawall justified by a homeowner’s littoral property rights
is unreasonable in light of the public’s right to enjoy the state’s beaches
under the Public Trust. In other words, because private property rights to
Trust lands are subordinate to the public’s Trust interests in those lands, a
landowner does not have free and clear property rights to a littoral lot.
Therefore, where a littoral landholder does something that violates the
Public Trust, he no longer can claim a valid property interest that justifies
the violative action.

C. Takings Case Law and Why Prohibitions on Coastal
Armoring Are not Unconstitutional Takings
As Joesph Sax wrote in one of his many widely cited articles on the
Public Trust Doctrine, “[i]t makes economic sense to prevent the
government from taking the property of an individual owner, but it is
difficult to understand why the government should be prevented from taking
property which is owned by the public as a whole.”107 As discussed above,
where Penn Central recognized that the Fifth Amendment protects individuals
from alone bearing burdens that should be borne by the general public,108
such a principle does not apply inverselythe public as a whole cannot be
held responsible for bearing the burdens of a select few who own vulnerable
littoral property. Regardless of the unfortunate losses that private property
owners face, they cannot be allowed to protect their property at such a high
cost to the environment, the public, and the public’s right to enjoy Trust
lands.

105.

Id. at 145.

106.

Id. at 145-46.

107.

Sax, supra note 13, at 479.

108.
(1960)).

Penn Central at 123 (quoting Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49

269

West

Northwest, Vol. 19, No. 2, Summer 2013

1. The State’s Authority Under the Public Trust Doctrine
Expands with Evolving Public Needs
In 1894, the Supreme Court held in Shively v. Bowlby109 that improvement
by individuals to tidal lands is subordinate to public rights, and that the
rights of littoral owners to their properties are subject to the authority of the
government to protect Public Trust lands.110 California reinforced the Shively
holding in Marks v. Whitney.111 There the court held that an owner of Tomales
Bay tidal property had no right to violate the Public Trust by developing that
property.112 The Marks court wrote that one of the most important Trust uses
is preservation of tidelands in their natural state, serving as ecological units
for study, open space, habitat for wildlife, and as contributing to the
aesthetics and climate of an area.113 The court further held that Public Trust
uses are “sufficiently flexible to encompass changing public needs,”114 and
that the State’s authority to regulate tidelands is absolute so long as the
State acts within the terms of the Public Trust.115
The Shively and Marks opinions establish that the State’s authority to
regulate private property rights expands as the need to regulate expands.
Perhaps 50 years ago the State would not have had the occasion to prohibit
a landowner from building a seawall to reinforce a landowner’s beachfront
lotthough the State would have had then, as it does now, the power to
restrict that action. But today, in the face of global warming and imminent
sea level rise, the State’s ability to prohibit the construction of such seawalls
is necessary, and justified on the basis of not only the common law Public
Trust Doctrine, but also the Coastal Act and the Article X, section 4 of the
California Constitution. Because littoral landowners have been and are on
notice that their rights to Public Trust lands are subject to limitation, those
property owners cannot successfully make takings claims against the State’s
exercise of its power to limit those coastal property rights.
2. The Potential Benefits of Protecting Existing Coastal
Development Must Be Weighed Against the Adverse
Effects on the Natural Environment and Public Access
Nollan v. California Coastal Commission is one of the textbook California
takings cases. As mentioned in the takings section above, the case involved
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the Coastal Commission’s grant of a building permit conditioned on
Nollan’s agreement to a public easement across his property to allow for
beach access.116 The Coastal Commission defended the permit condition on
the grounds that Nollan’s construction of a new house would create a wall of
houses that would prevent the public from realizing the existence of a public
beach beyond.117
The Supreme Court found the condition was an
unconstitutional taking because there was not a sufficient nexus between
the required easement and preventing a visual barrier to the beach.118
While the Nollan Court’s substantial nexus test remains good law,
Justice Brennan’s dissent presents a very compelling argument for why the
Coastal Commission’s action in the case was in fact not a taking. Brennan
contends that the (federal) Coastal Zone Management Act and the Public
Trust bind the Coastal Commission to ensure public access to the state’s
beaches.119 In this case, the Commission’s imposition of the easement on
Nollan’s building permit was the manifestation of the agency’s effort to
exercise its duties flexibly, and to find balance between public and private
interests.120 Brennan also points to Article X, section 4 of the California
Constitution in arguing that the Commission has a duty to condition
coastline development on provisions that protect public coastal access.121
Finally, Brennan reminds us that California coastal development has been
strictly regulated since the passage of the Coastal Act, and that littoral
owners are on notice that development will be sanctioned only so long as it
does not impede public beach access.122
Brennan’s Nollan dissent reads like a general coastal development
balancing test. While private property rights exist, they must be exercised in
accordance with the principles espoused by the Coastal Act, the California
Constitution, and the Public Trust Doctrine. Those principles require the
State to act in furtherance of environmental protection and the people’s
right to use and enjoy Trust lands. In considering development permits, the
State should weigh the applicant’s property rights and the impact of the
proposed project with the effects that the development will have on the
coastal ecosystem and the public’s right and ability to access and make use
of that coastal land. This opinion serves as further evidence of the fact that
littoral property rights are usufructuary and cannot be exercised in a
vacuum. A property owner can exercise his right to develop his beachfront
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lot only where that right is not outweighed by the adverse impact of the
development on Public Trust lands and the general public’s interests in
those lands.

VI.

State Regulation of Coastal Property Rights to Protect
Public Trust Interests in the Shoreline is Not an
Unconstitutional Taking

Penn Central, Lucas, Nollan, and Dolan established that an
unconstitutional regulatory taking occurs when a state regulation is not in
furtherance of the public interest and entirely deprives land of its economic
value, and where conditions placed on land use permits are not
substantially related and roughly proportional to the goals sought to be
achieved by the conditions. The caveat to the traditional understanding of
takings doctrine is that the Public Trust, a doctrine that has been recognized
and applied since long before the U.S. Constitution was written, prevents
owners of Public Trust lands from ever obtaining property rights that are free
and clear of State regulation and limitation. So while a regulation
prohibiting a littoral landowner from arming their property against sea level
rise could possibly result in a total loss of economic value under Lucas, the
availability of such a claim is limited by California’s codification of the
Public Trust.
As detailed previously, Penn Central’s ad-hoc takings analysis of
whether a regulation has deprived an owner of economically viable use of
their property includes considering whether or not a landowner’s
investment-backed expectations have been foiled. But as Takacs explains in
his consideration of Penn Central, “[t]he Public Trust Doctrine supports the
notion that ‘private’ ‘property’ ‘owners’ ‘investment-backed expectations’
should always include the idea that certain resources are and always have
been within the public’s provenance.”123 More broadly, private property
rights and landowners’ expectations are limited by the Public Trust provision
that property rights in Trust lands are, and always have been, limited by
Trust principles. Therefore, a State limitation on a landowner’s exercise of
property rights that conflicts with the State’s duty to uphold the Public Trust
is not a taking because private property rights in Trust lands extend only as
far as they do not conflict with the Public Trust.
More particularly, because the construction of seawalls on and to
protect private lots destroys and blocks public access to California’s
beaches, such an exercise is violative of the Public Trust; and therefore can
be prohibited by the State within the bounds of its authority under not only
the Public Trust Doctrine itself, but the Coastal Act’s codification of that
doctrine. Sax illustrates this point in his reference to a California Attorney
General Opinion: “[t]he owner of lands subject to the public trust may use
123.
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the property as he sees fit, subject to the power of the State to abate
(prevent or remove) any nuisance or illegal obstruction he may create
thereon, and to reoccupy the lands in the event such occupation becomes
necessary for trust purposes.”124 The Attorney General Opinion Sax
mentions further reinforces the point made here: that private rights simply
do not exist beyond the scope of the Public Trust Doctrine; and where a
landowner acts so as to encroach on Trust interests, the State has the
authority, and is obligated by the Coastal Act, to push back against the
private action in protection of Trust lands.

VII. Conclusion
As the mean high tide linewhich generally separates privately held
coastal land from public landmoves inland with rising sea levels, private
property owners will want to armor the coastline along their lots in order to
protect their beachfront homes. On as large a scale as would be necessary
to protect all of California’s coastal development, such seawalls would
drown beaches, destroy tidal ecosystems, and violate the Public Trust
Doctrine. While a policy of forbidding coastal armoring to protect private
property is not without its adverse effects, allowing such widespread
armoringat the cost of destroying the shorelines and beaches that the
Public Trust exists to protectis an unacceptable alternative.
As established by cases such as National Audubon Society and Marks v.
Whitney, preserving a natural asset so as to allow the public to enjoy
ecosystems in their natural state is a valid protectable use under the Public
Trust Doctrine. Furthermore, among others, these cases recognize that
protectable Public Trust uses change with evolving public needs and that
the State’s authority to act in furtherance of the Public Trust is absolute.
The articles and cases explored in this paper, and the codification of the
Public Trust in California by Article X, section 4 and the Coastal Act,
demonstrate that owners of coastal property only have property rights
insofar as those rights do not run afoul of the Public Trust. Construction of
seawalls that not only block public access to beaches, but drown and
destroy those beaches, are clear violations of the modern understanding of
the Public Trust Doctrine in California. Therefore, the State can prohibit
coastal armoring where it is adverse to Trust interests.
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* * *

274

